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NOTES
Butler v. Baber:' Absolute Liability for Environmental
Hazards
An oyster lessee sued a mineral lessee for damage to his oyster crop
caused by the mineral lessee's dredging operations. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court, with Justice Dixon writing for the majority, held the
mineral lessee "absolutely" liable under Civil Code article 6673 for the
damage to the oyster beds.4
The State of Louisiana granted an oyster and a mineral lease on
essentially the same property in Wilkson Bay. The mineral lessee, Baber,
wanted to drill a well on the land in his lease. To move the necessary
equipment to his well site, he arranged to have a canal dredged. Baber
obtained all necessary permits and purchased a right-of-way from the
oyster lessee, Butler. The canal was dredged, and the well drilled. The
drilling proved unsuccessful, and Baber had the canal plugged and
backfilled. When Butler returned to harvest oysters shortly after the
canal was plugged, he found his oysters either dead or dying. Even
though Butler had the canal designed to minimize damage to the oyster
beds, several inches of silt were suffocating the oysters.
Butler sued the consultant who designed the canal and Baber5 under
two theories of recovery: negligence under article 23156 and strict liability
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1. 529 So. 2d 374 (La. 1988).
2. Absolute liability is where liability is imposed by simply establishing that the
plaintiff was injured and that the tortfeasor's act was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's
injury. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 378; Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498
(La. 1982); Lombard v. Sewerage and Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905, 912, 913 (La. 1973).
This should be distinguished from strict liability, which at one time referred to analysis
used in absolute liability, but now represents a cause of action in which the plaintiff
must prove, in addition to damage and cause in fact, that the activity or object was an
unreasonable risk of harm. Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983); Loescher v.
Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976). See also infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text for
examples of applications of the two doctrines.
3. See infra note 82 for the text of article 667.
4. This interpretation was recently supported in Street v. Equitable Petroleum Corp.,
532 So. 2d 887 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), which held that an oil company was absolutely
liable for oil spilled from an oilwell production facility that damaged a neighboring camp.
5. Both dredgers settled before trial and were not considered in the suit. Butler v.
Baber, 512 So. 2d 653, 654 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 reads in pertinent part: "Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
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under article 667. Both the trial court and the appellate court7 found
that Butler failed to prove the negligence of Baber.8 The appellate court
also rejected Butler's strict liability claim under article 667, finding that
co-extensive lessees cannot be considered neighbors. 9 The supreme court
affirmed the lower courts' disposition of the negligence claim; however,
on the article 667 claim, the supreme court reversed and found Baber,
but not the consultant, absolutely liable under article 667.10
THE OPINION
The Butler decision is best characterized in the language of the late
Professor Joseph Dainow "the court achieved a result which might well
seem to be the right and equitable one in the administration of justice,
but an analysis of its opinion leaves one in unavoidable confusion.""
There are three basic reasons the Butler opinion causes such confusion.
First, the Butler opinion is cryptic, based on largely individual analyses
of seven prior Louisiana Supreme Court decisions with no apparent
conclusion.' 2 Second, these decisions conflict with one another, and the
court offers little guidance on which opinion or theory to use to interpret
article 667. Finally, the vagueness of the opinion is compounded by the
conflicts already existing in both prior jurisprudence and doctrine, in
which no single theory of interpretation has won acceptance. 3
This note will first present an analysis and summary of the Butler
opinion. Based on this analysis, the note discusses the implications of
the Butler opinion's interpretation of article 667. The final section an-
alyzes other possible theories of interpretation of article 667, and its
companion articles 668 and 669, and suggests an alternative framework
of interpretation that could have provided the same results as Butler as
well as a consistent framework for future decisions involving article 667.
7. Butler, 512 So. 2d at 658.
8. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 377.
9. 512 So. 2d at 659.
10. 529 So. 2d at 377.
11. Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term-
Property, 16 La. L. Rev. 227, 227 (1956).
12. The court did not consider any jurisprudence before 1971 contending all previous
cases were based on common law nuisance, Butler, 529 So. 2d at 377, even though many
cases prior to 1971 contained civilian interpretations of article 667. See, e.g., article 667
interpreted using French doctrine regarding abuse of right and the obligations of neigh-
borhood, Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 45 La. 233, 236-50, 82 So. 206,
207-12 (1919); article 667 construed with article 2315, Egan v. Hotel Gruenwald Co., 129
La. 163, 173, 55 So. 750, 753 (1910), Mayer v. Ford, 12 So. 2d 618, 621 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1943); and article 667 interpreted using doctrine of sic utere, Hauck v. Brunet, 50
So. 2d 495, 497 (La. App. Orl. 1951).
13. For discussion see infra text accompanying notes 74-81.
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ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
The Butler opinion does not clearly articulate a single theory by
which to interpret article 667, and much of the analysis the court
concluded is disguised in its discussion of seven prior cases. Nevertheless,
the language of the opinion and the holdings of the cases discussed
seem to present four significant points about article 667. First, a breach
of the duty imposed by article 667 is a type of "fault" under article
2315, and any resulting action for damages is based on article 2315.
Second, the duty of article 667 protects any possessor or owner of an
immovable from damage caused either by the possessor or owner of a
nearby or adjoining immovable or by that person's agents directly in-
volved in the injury-producing activity. Third, article 667 imposes ab-
solute liability. Finally, an action under article 667 is not restricted to
ultrahazardous activities, and damage from any activity relating to land
triggers liability.
Article 667 as a Duty under Article 2315
After Butler it remains unsettled whether article 667 alone may be
the basis for an action, or whether article 667 merely expresses a type
of fault under article 2315. Both the jurisprudence and commentators
in Louisiana are in conflict. 14 This is not without importance. If article
667 creates separate action, the courts would not be restricted by the
tort rules developed under article 2315. Courts would be free, for ex-
ample, to create individual prescriptive periods, and burdens of proof
for article 667.11
14. Some courts and commentators argue that an action for damages based on article
667 is independent of article 2315. See, e.g., Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the
Framework of Vicinage: Articles 667-69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 Tul. L. Rev.
195, 223 (1974) [hereinafter Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility]. See also Dainow, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Property, 27 La. L.
Rev. 436 (1967). For damages, see Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 284 So. 2d 905,
912 (La. 1973). For injunctions, see Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 828 (La.
1974) (Barham, J., concurring); Yiannopoulos, Violations of the Obligations of Vicinage:
Remedies Under Articles 667 and 669, 34 La. L. Rev. 476, 582 (1974) [hereinafter
Yiannopoulos, Obligations of Vicinage]. But see Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The
Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 Tul. L. Rev. 701, 708 (1966) ("[Article 667] is not an
action in property despite the fact that it is found in that portion of the Code which
deals with servitudes and despite certain obiter remarks of the Louisiana Supreme Court.").
15. For example, the Louisiana Legislature almost passed a bill that would have
eliminated strict liability for things under Civil Code articles 2315, 2317, and 2322.
However, the bill contained no reference to article 667, and would not have limited
absolute or strict liability under 667. La. S. 686, 1988 Reg. Sess.
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The Butler opinion, nevertheless, stresses the necessity to bring an
action based on article 667 through article 2315.16 The court's interpre-
tation of article 667 and 2315 together is consistent with the framework
for interpreting delictual actions adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court
in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp. ' 7 Under the Langlois interpretation
the term "fault" in article 2315 is interpreted broadly to include all
types of delictual liability including strict and absolute liability.'" All
actions based on fault must be brought through article 2315. Other code
articles and statutes only create duties that, when breached, constitute
fault under 2315. Article 667, under this view, would likewise create a
duty within article 2315.' 9 Any action for damages as a result of the
breach of duty of article 667 would be brought through article 2315.
Recent Louisiana jurisprudence shows a trend toward interpreting
article 667 with article 2315.20 This is not to say that, even after Butler,
there is no room for an interpretation of article 667 that would allow
an independent action for damages. 2' The supreme court in Butler made
numerous references to Langlois, but never expressly held that article
667 creates no independent action. Furthermore, three of the cases
16. Cases cited that interpret article 667 with article 2315 include: Dean v. Hercules,
Inc., 328 So. 2d 69, 72 (La. 1976); Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93, 99
(La. 1975) (Barham, J., concurring); Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1083,
249 So. 2d 133, 139 (1971). The following are examples of quotes from Butler: "[a]
violation of 667 may constitute delictual action based on fault under 2315." 529 So. 2d
at 380. "[a] violation of article 667 is most closely associated with an action for damages
based on article 2315. It can be said that a violation of article 667 constitutes fault within
the meaning of article 2315." Id. at 380. "'Fault' in the sense of Langlois encompasses
more than negligence, and violation of 667 constitutes fault." Id. at 381.
17. 258 La. 1067, 1083, 240 So. 2d 133, 130 (1971).
18. Langlois, 258 La. 1076-77, 249 So. 2d at 137. This interpretation was first
suggested by Professor Stone. Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials for the
Decision of a Case, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 159, 207-08 (1942) and adopted by the Orleans
Court of Appeal in Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So. 2d 495, 497 (La. App. Orl. 1951). This
interpretation was also followed in Gulf Insurance Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance
Corp., 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
19. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 16.
21. The Louisiana Supreme Court has never held that claims under article 667 must
be brought through article 2315, only that they were similar to tort actions under article
2315. Louisiana courts have continued to consider suits under article 667 as actions based
on property law. See, e.g., Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 912; Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
259 La. 1, 14, 240 So. 2d 181, 186 (1971). Even in Dean, 328 So. 2d at 72 (citing
Langlois, 258 La. 1067, 259 So. 2d 133), which was supposed to have settled the controversy
regarding the nature of an action under article 667, the supreme court left the door open
for continuing to bring actions based on article 667 alone. "An action for damages for
a violation of article 667 is most closely associated with an action for damages based on
C.C. 2315 et seq. Indeed, it can be said that a violation of article 667 constitutes fault
within the meaning of article 2315."
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discussed in the opinion, Chaney v. Travelers Insurance Co.,22 Hilliard
v. ShufJ23 and Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board,24 recognized actions
for damages or injunction based exclusively on article 667.
Even though Butler does not clearly preclude an independent right
of action under article 667, the better view, based on a close examination
of the Butler opinion, is that there is no independent action. The Butler
court first stressed interpreting article 667 with article 2315 in its dis-
cussion of Justice Barham's concurrence in Lombard v. Sewerage &
Water Board: "the court [in imposing liability under article 667] should
use 2315, analogizing 668-669 or 2315 and 2317."25 Further, in the
court's discussion of Dean v. Hercules, Inc., the court reiterates the
delictual nature of an action under article 667: "a violation of article
667 is most closely associated with an action for damages based on
article 2315," and "[it can be said that a violation of article 667
constitutes fault within the meaning of article 2315."26 Finally, Justice
Dixon in his conclusion refers to Langlois again and states that "fault
under 667 is the damage done to neighboring property, and relief under
667 in the sense of Langlois encompasses more than negligence, and
violation of 667 constitutes fault. '" Z7
Parties Liable Under Article 667
In addition, to reaffirming that article 667 must be applied through
article 2315 in an action for damages, the Butler court expanded the
scope of the term "proprietor" and "neighbor" used in article 667.28
Article 667 governs the activities of a "proprietor" that harm his "neigh-
bor." ' 29 A "neighbor" is simply a nearby or adjoining proprietor who
is harmed by the "proprietor's" actions.30 By definition, "proprietor"
means the actual owner of a legal right to property.3 But the courts
and commentators in Louisiana have favored a less restrictive application
22. 529 La. 1, 15, 249 So. 2d 181, 186 (1971).
23. 260 La. 384, 391, 256 So. 2d 127, 131 (1972).
24. 284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973).
25. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 378; see also id. at 379 (citing Hero Lands Co., 310 So.
2d at 99): "He said that violation of 667 may constitute delictual action based on fault
... which does not require proof of negligence."
26. 529 So. 2d at 379.
27. Id. at 381.
28. 529 So. 2d 381 (quoting Langlois, 258 La. at 1080, 249 So. 2d at 138).
29. For text of article 667, see infra note 82.
30. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 381. This is consistent with prior interpretations of article
667. See, e.g., Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 223-24. See also infra
note 116.
31. Black's Law Dictionary 1098 (15th ed. 1979).
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of the term.32 the Butler court supported this broad interpretation,
liberally defining "proprietor" as the owner of a real right and any of
his agents who were directly involved in the injury-producing activity.33
The court in Butler concentrated most of its discussion on the various
interpretations of "proprietor" in the cases and emphasized a liberal
definition several times in the opinion. The court stated that a "pro-
prietor is not limited to owners, '3 4 and that "the trend has been toward
an expansion of the classes of those who are entitled to recovery as
well as an expansion of the classes from whom recovery can be had.""
The court specifically included tenants3 6 and lessees3 7 in its definition,
as well as agents of the possessor or landowner.38 In its conclusion,
however, the court restricted the meaning of proprietor to include only
agents who were directly involved in the injury-producing activity. 9 The
court suggested that to be held liable under article 667, the nature of
the relationship between the agent and a landowner must have been the
32. The word "proprietor" need not be limited to "owner." Any person assuming
the position of owner, usufructuary, possessor in good or bad faith, or lessee,
may qualify as proprietor by virtue of an expansive interpretation. Moreover,
the proprietor may be liable not only for his own acts but also for the acts
of others, such as servants either by virtue of directly applicable provisions of
the Civil Code (arts. 2317-24) or by virtue of a contractual relationship.
Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 914 (quoting Yiannopoulos, Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1979-1971 Term-Property, 32 La. L. Rev. 172, 186 (1972)). See also
Stone, supra note 14, at 704-05.
33. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 381.
34. Id. at 379 (citing Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 914).
35. Id. at 381 (citing Langlois, 248 La. at 1080, 249 So. 2d at 138). The court cites
as authority Yiannopoulos, Obligations of Vicinage, supra note 14, at 477, and Yian-
nopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 210, even though Yiannopoulos concluded
that "[a]rticles 667 and 668 were apparently intended to apply to relations among land-
owners exclusively ... [reserving] [a]rticle 669 . . . to all persons using immovable property."
36. The court noted that "a tenant had a right of action to enjoin objectionable
aspects of an operation conducted on neighboring property where that operation threatened
the health and comfort of the tenant." Butler, 529 So. 2d at 379 (citing State ex rel.
Violet v. King, 46 La. Ann. 78, 14 So. 423 (1894)). See also Butler, 529 So. 2d 379
(citing Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 824 (La. 1974)).
37. "From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that article 667 applies to lessees.
There is no reason that co-lessees of the same or adjacent property cannot be neighbors
under the language of article 667." Butler, 529 So. 2d at 381.
38. Id.
39. Robert Waldron,- however, and Robert Waldron, Inc., [the consultant who
designed the canal] are neither "neighbors" nor "proprietors" of any sort.
Unlike Boh Brothers (the construction contractor) in the Lombard case, and
Jenkins Construction Company in the Chaney case, Waldron's activity did not
destroy or damage the oyster beds. Waldron was employed by Baber to collect
information for him and advise him.
Id. at 381.
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cause-in-fact of the damage. 40 The court also stated that once the pro-
prietor relationship is established, all "proprietors" are solidarily liable. 4 1
Breach of 667 Imposes Absolute Liability
The Butler court interpreted article 667 as imposing absolute lia-
bility.42 Under this view, any neighbor damaged by a breach of article
667 recovers simply by proving cause-in-fact and damages. 43 The court
cited several cases that support this interpretation of article 667." Most
importantly, the court cited the reasoning of the Lombard v. Sewer and
Water Board decision as being the "proper analysis for cases under
[article] 667." 4 The Lombard opinion contains a clear statement of the
elements necessary to prove a claim under Louisiana law for absolute
liability: "[I]f causation and damage are established, [the] defendants
must be held responsible under principles announced in Article 667 of
the Civil Code." Liability does not depend on the reasonableness and
prudence of the defendant's conduct. As Justice Dixon stressed in the
court's conclusion, "[rielief under 667 requires, therefore, only that
damages and causation be proved."
47
40. This is similar to the analysis proposed by the Fifth Circuit in Perkins v. F.I.E.
Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). In Perkins, the court held there were three
requirements for absolute liability under article 667.
1. The activity must be an activity relating to land or to other immovables.
2. The activity itself must be the cause in fact and the defendant must have
engaged directly in the injury producing activity.
3. The activity must not require the substandard conduct of a third party to
cause injury.
Id. at 1264-69.
41. "[A]gents of the proprietor, such as contractors and representatives, are solidarily
liable with the proprietor if his activity causes damage to a neighbor." Butler, 529 So.
2d at 378 (citing Chancy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 14, 249 So. 2d 181, 186
(1971)). The court reinforces this conclusion later stating, "non proprietors are solidarily
liable under 667." Id. (citing Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 914).
42. See supra note 2 for the definition of absolute liability.
43. The language of article 667, as well as much of the jurisprudence in Louisiana,
supports this interpretation. Article 667 states "[the proprietor] can not make any work
on [his estate] which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or
which may be the cause of any damage to him."
44. Cases cited in the opinion that interpret article 667 as imposing absolute liability
include: Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 97; Chancy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1,
15, 249 So. 2d 181, 186 (1971).
45. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 378.
46. Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 912. For an example of a Louisiana definition of absolute
liability, see Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498, "Louisiana courts have imposed an absolute liability
which virtually makes the enterpriser an insurer . . . and the injured party recovers simply
by proving damage and causation."
47. Butler, 529 So. 2d at 381. The court also states: "Fault under 667 . .. requires,
therefore, only that damage and causation be proved." Id. at 381, and "under 667, there
is recovery despite reasonableness and prudence if the work causes damage." Id. at 379
(citing Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 97).
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Article 667 is not Limited to Ultrahazardous Activities
The Butler opinion, however, does not define what activities result
in absolute liability. The court implies that liability under article 667
may be based on any activity that causes harm to neighboring property. 41
All the cases cited, however, involved activity characterized as ultra-
hazardous, and arguably every case that has ever applied article 66749
has involved ultrahazardous activity. 0 In particular, several of the cases
48. Although Butler does not define "neighbor," language used by the court suggests
that the "neighbors" must be on the same or adjacent property. "There is no reason
that co-lessees of the same or adjacent property cannot be neighbors under the language
of article 667." Butler, 529 So. 2d at 381. But the court also recognizes that neighbor
may be interpreted liberally: "the trend has been toward an expansion of the classes of
those who are entitled to recovery as well as an expansion of the classes from whom
recovery can be had." Id. at 381. See also Stone, supra note 14, at 711.
To be a "neighbor" one need not be an adjoining landowner; as article 651
[no longer in the code] says "it suffices that they [the lands] be sufficiently
near, for one to derive benefit from the servitude on the other." It seems clear
that the plaintiff must be one whose interest has been invaded by the defendant's
conduct, but the nature of the interest required is not clear. . . . [Ilt seems clear
that the plaintiff must have a property interest, but again we may ask: is it
necessary that "proprietor" mean "owner"?
49. Article 667 when cited in conjunction with article 669 has been applied to non-
ultrahazardous activities. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (La.
1985); Bornstein v. Joseph Fein Caters, 255 So. 2d 800, 806 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
50. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. at 877, 80 So. 2d at'
849 ("It has been universally recognized that when, as here, the defendant, though without
fault, is engaged in a lawful business, conducted according to modern and approved
methods and with reasonable care, by such activities causes risk or peril to others, the
doctrine of absolute liability is clearly applicable."). See also Stewart v. City of Pineville,
511 So. 2d 26, 29-30 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) ("[B]ecause the construction and activity
conducted by the City of Pineville was not ultra-hazardous, . . . the damage to their
property although real, is not compensable based on [article 667]"); Elnagger v. Fred H.
Moran Constr. Corp., 468 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Schulingkamp v. Board
of Levee Commr's of Orleans, 425 So. 2d 913, 914 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) ("Art. 667
does not support the judgment against [Defendant]. Unless [Defendant's] use of his property
constituted ultra hazardous activity, it was incumbent upon Plaintiff to prove negligence
on [Defendant's] part in order to recover.").
The author is aware of only one case where article 667 was applied to a non-ultra-
hazardous activity, Androwski v. Ole McDonald's Farms, Inc., 407 So. 2d 455 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982). However, Androwski involved damage from the overflow of a sewerage
oxidation pond that arguably could be considered an ultra-hazardous activity. See Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520 (1977) and F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gray,
The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986).
The restriction of article 667 liability to ultra-hazardous activities was also recognized
in Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966 Term-Torts,
26 La. L. Rev. 510, 516 (1966): "Although the Louisiana courts have paid lip service to
a literal acceptance of article 667 on several occasions, it is significant that in every
instance where this has occurred there either was involved an ultra-hazardous activity that
would have called for strict liability under the commonly accepted doctrine of ultra-
1146 [Vol. 49
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cited in the opinion imply that liability under article 667 should be
limited to ultrahazardous activities."' It is widely recognized that article
667's duty is based on the doctrine of sic utere,5 2 and the Butler court
seems to accept this interpretation."
The doctrine of sic utere represents a legal obligation on proprietors
to use their property so that the use does not injure their neighboring
property owners.5 4 However, the sic utere doctrine provides little guidance
regarding exactly what activities are prohibited. Since the Butler court
did not explicitly contradict the past interpretations limiting article 667
to ultrahazardous activities, it could be argued that the court intended
to continue restricting article 667 to ultrazazardous activity. This limi-
tation could be argued consistently with the Butler facts, because similar
acts to the dredging, such as constructing a canal on dry land, has been
held to be ultrahazardous." Dredging could also meet the Second Re-
hazardous activities, or there existed a private nuisance (which represents an area of
liability all its owns .... " See also Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14,
at 217, 218: "No case has been found in which a landowner was held liable without
negligence under articles 667 and 668 on account of acts that were not ultrahazardous."
51. This inference was present in three of the seven cases cited interpreting article
667: Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 100 (denial of rehearing) (the liability of a natural
gas company whose pipelines restricted development on neighboring property); Lombard,
284 So. 2d at 912-13 (damages caused by heavy construction during the building of an
underground canal); Hilliard v. Shuff, 260 La. 384, 389-90, 256 So. 2d 127, 129 (1972)
(storage of gasoline and diesel fuel). See, e.g., Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 912-13 (citing
Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955)) ("[W]hen, as
here, the defendant, though without fault, is engaged in a lawful business, conducted
according to modern and approved methods and with reasonable care, by such activities
causes risk or peril to others the doctrine of absolute liability is clearly applicable."
52. The full phrase of sic utere is Sic utere ut alienum non laedes-Use your own
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another. Black's Law Dictionary 1238
(5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., cases cited infra note 52. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,
227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955); Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So. 2d 495 (La. App. Orl.
1951). For commentators, see, e.g., Dainow, supra note 11, at 228; Malone, The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Torts, 18 La. L. Rev. 63, 66
(1957); Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 209; Yiannopoulos, Obli-
gations of Vicinage, supra note 14, at 482.
53. The court in Butler does not discuss the sic utere doctrine and only obliquely
refers to it. The court found that the codification of the sic utere doctrine deals with
obligations much broader than the obligations arising from servitude." Butler, 529 So.
2d at 308 (citing Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 59 (La. 1976) and Yiannopoulos,
Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 203. Nevertheless, all the cases cited in the opinion
that discuss the origin and nature of article 667 are unanimous in their support of
interpreting article 667 as an expression of the doctrine of sic utere. Dean, 328 So. 2d
at 71; Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 97: Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 912; Chaney v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 15, 249 So. 2d 181, 185 (1971).
54. Chaney, 259 La. at 15, 249 So. 2d at 186.
55. Article 667 was held applicable to: the digging of a canal using heavy construction
equipment, Chaney, 251 La. at 4, 249 So. 2d at 182; and the construction of a ditch
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statement of Torts definition of an ultrahazardous activity, although this
is unlikely. 6 Interpreted this way, the decision would not be a dramatic
expansion of liability. Absolute liability under article 667 would still be
limited to ultrahazardous activity. Wetland dredging would simply be a
new classification of an ultrahazardous activity.
On the other hand, the opposite interpretation-that article 667
imposes absolute liability whether or not the activity is ultrahazardous-
could be strongly argued from the Butler opinion. The opinion does
not expressly limit article 667 to ultrahazardous activities.17 Moreover,
the dredging involved in this case is possibly not an ultrahazardous
and underground canal, Lombard, 284 So. 2d at 906, 907. Of course, the dredging of
a canal in an isolated marsh area may pose significantly lower risks than heavy construction
in an urban area. Further, the accumulation of silt may be outside the scope of the risk
of heavy vibrations that imposed the ultra-hazardous duty on heavy construction in the
first place.
56. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 519, 520 (1977).
Sec. 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Sec. 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Using section 520's analysis there are two main problems in classifying the dredging as
an abnormally dangerous activity. One, the dredging may not encompass a high degree
of risk in isolated marsh areas. Two, the last factor, (f), may be difficult to prove since
the activity must not be commonly used or of significant value to the community and
surrounding area, and dredging canals for oil production is very important to south-east
Louisiana.
57. Ultra-hazardous activities has been defined as
activities in which the risk may be altogether reasonable and still high enough
that the party ought not undertake the activity without assuming the conse-
quences. Such activities include pile driving, storage of toxic gas, blasting with
explosives, crop dusting with airplanes and the like, in which the activity can
cause injury to others, even when conducted with the greatest prudence and
care.
Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982).
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activity. 8 The dredging of a canal in an isolated marsh area poses
significantly lower risks then heavy construction in an urban area,59 the
context within which absolute liability was earlier imposed by the court.
This fact suggests a distinction from the earlier cases. If Mr. Baber's
dredging was not ultrahazardous, then the Butler court has enormously
expanded article 667 liability. At least one lower court in a post-Butler
case used this exact line of reasoning to find liability. 60
Impact of the Butler Decision
In some senses, the Butler opinion is an affirmation of existing
interpretations of article 667. The classification of article 667 as delictual
in nature, the liberal definitions of "proprietor" and "neighbor," and
the imposition of absolute liability were all recognized principles of
article 667 before Butler. What is unclear, however, is the scope of
activities imposing absolute liability.
There are two possible interpretations of the Butler opinion. First,
the case might be interpreted as doing no more than classifying wetland
dredging operations as an ultrahazardous activity, and hence subjecting
these activities to absolute liability under pre-existing principles. 6 If this
interpretation is correct, the Butler decision will have little impact; only
those who dredge canals would have increased liability. The case would
barely affect the existing law in Louisiana. However, as noted previously,
this interpretation is unlikely. 62
The second possible interpretation of the opinion is more disturbing.
The Butler court may have established a new basis of absolute liability
in Louisiana, independent of the recognized action for ultrahazardous
activities. In Butler, the supreme court seems to have turned to a more
literal reading, in some respects, of article 667. This new approach would
impose absolute liability on proprietors63 for any activity on their land
that causes damage to a neighboring" landowners. This interpretation
of article 667 would create a new basis of liability that parallels with
58. Street v. Equitable Petroleum Corp., 532 So. 2d 887, 889 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1988).
59. For discussion of the determination of ultra-hazardous liability, see infra notes
62-63 and accompanying text.
60. Street, 532 So. 2d at 889 ("Although caselaw exists which supports defendants'
contention that the article only applies to ultrahazardous activities, the Butler case does
not buttress that limitation . . . [i]t was nowhere indicated that the dredging operations
were inherently dangerous or ultrahazardous.").
61. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56 for a discussion of whether dredging
of a canal constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
63. For the definition of proprietor, see supra note, 28-34 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 48.
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other bases of liability including: negligence under Civil Code articles
2315 and 2316, strict liability for garde of things under Civil Code
article 2317, and strict liability for ruin of buildings under Civil Code
article 2322.
A hypothetical will illustrate the problem. Suppose a diseased tree
on the defendant's land fell onto the plaintiff's property and damaged
his car. 65 Assume the plaintiff could prove damages, cause in fact, and
that harm was within the scope of the risk. The plaintiff would have
three possible bases for establishing liability. Pre-Butler law provided
the injured party a number of theories of recovery. First, the plaintiff
could allege negligence. To recover, he would have to establish that a
reasonable man under the circumstances would have recognized the
hazard of the tree and avoided it. Second, the plaintiff could allege
strict liability under article 2317. In this instance he would only have
to prove that the condition of the diseased tree presented an unreasonable
risk of harm under the circumstances. 66 Under previous law this would
be the limit of the plaintiff's theories for recovery.
Under the broad interpretation of article 667 described in Butler,
however, the plaintiff could also allege absolute liability under article
667. All the plaintiff would be required to prove is that the activity in
question was on the defendant's land, that the injury occurred, and that
the tree falling was the cause-in-fact of the injury. Unlike the other
theories, this theory provides no opportunity for individual policy con-
siderations in deciding whether or not to impose liability.
This is completely different than the absolute liability that has been
applied in the past for ultrahazardous activities. Absolute liability had
been imposed previously because the activities by their nature involved
an extremely large element of risk. 67 Society allowed these activities
because they provided social benefit; but, because of their high degree
of risk the courts predetermined the risk-utility balance of the conduct
(the activity per se posed an unreasonable risk of harm) and automatically
imposed liability where there was proof of damage and causation. 6
No similar policy justification supports extending absolute liability
to all activities. If absolute liability under article 667 is imposed on any
65. This is based on the fact situation in Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La.
1976).
66. See, e.g., Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983) for a discussion of the
difference between negligence and strict liability.
67. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 comments h and i; F. Harper, F. James
and 0. Gray, supra note 50, § 14.1, at 182, 183; W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 78, at 555 (5th ed. 1984). See also Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418
So. 2d at 498; Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 284 So. 2d at 913; Fontenot v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La. at 877, 80 So. 2d at 849.
68. See, e.g., Kent, 418 So. 2d 493.
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activity relating to land, there will never be any consideration of the
utility of the conduct in question. Liability will be imposed whether the
act is risky or not. Any person conducting a land-related activity, no
matter what the utility or the significance, will have to consider this
absolute liability both in evaluating the economic worth of a planned
activity and deciding whether to conduct this activity at all.
This interpretation would have a great impact on environmental law
in Louisiana. As mentioned, the owner of land and any possessor would
be solidarily liable for damage if it relates to any activity on their land. 69
The impact of this rule, in conjunction with the Butler interpretation
of article 667 liability, would be enormous. For example, a business
would be liable for any of its discharges into the water or air that
caused harm, even if they were reasonable under the circumstances and
the business had obtained the required necessary permits and authority.
Railroads would be absolutely liable for any discharge from trains that
caused harm to neighboring property, even if the trains were not owned
by the railroad, but only transited their tracks. A timber lessee and his
lessor would be liable for increased erosion on neighboring property as
a result of his timber operations, even if they were conducted in ac-
cordance with the highest standards. A farmer would be liable for any
run-off from his land that carried fertilizers and other agricultural chem-
icals harming neighboring property. In each situation regardless of how
careful or reasonable the actors were, they would be liable for any
damages on neighboring property as a result of their activities.
No commentator or opinion has ever favored so broad an inter-
pretation of article 667.70 While the wisdom of this policy choice is
outside the scope of this paper, the court does not justify why it imposed
liability solely on possessors of land and their agent, without establishing
a similar duty for other activities. 71 The Butler opinion may be the
beginning of expending liability without fault to all activities in Louis-
69. See supra note 47.
70. See, e.g., Malone, supra note 52, at 65, 66: "The proposition that a proprietor
cannot use his property in such a way as to injure his neighbor, irrespective of how
careful he may be, is simply too broad for general usage. The court's unguarded an-
nouncement is certain to rise to plaque it in later controversies .... It seems inescapable
that as cases arise the court will be obliged to sort out the types of damaging activities
for which non-fault liability will be imposed for those which it will not be so imposed.
Art. 667 provides no such leeway." See also Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra
note 14, at 212.
71. "Is article 667 to be taken at its literal face value as an arbitrary pronouncement
that landowners are subject to unqualified liability for any work done upon their land
that happens to injure a 'neighbor'? Is there some fatal magic in land ownership that
calls for a radical shift in the spectrum of liability and ignores the normal requirement
that losses are to be shifted only upon the shoulders of the blameworthy?" Malone, supra
note 52, at 515.
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iana.72 If the supreme court wishes to expand absolute liability in Louis-
iana, it should do so clearly and consistently. Then all members of
society and the legislature would have a chance to consider the con-
sequences of such a policy and intelligently accept or reject it.
OTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLE 667
The Butler opinion, like most cases interpreting article 667, is am-
biguous in its holding regarding article 667, and this note's analysis is
only a suggested explanation. It is unclear whether the court intended
such a broad expansion of absolute liability under article 667. But
regardless of whether the court intended to expand absolute liability in
Louisiana or merely to reaffirm prior jurisprudence limiting absolute
liability to ultrahazardous activities, there needs to be some clear and
consistent framework to guide future decisions involving article 667. This
section will review past interpretations of article 667 in order to arrive
at the best possible interpretation, both practically and theoretically, in
light of the implications of Butler.
History of Article 667
The muddle of the Butler opinion is by no means unique in the
history of jurisprudence and commentary interpreting article 667. 71 In
72. This liability without fault is one of the principles of the theory of enterprise
liability. Enterprise liability has been defined as "losses to society created or caused by
an enterprise, or more simply, by an activity, ought to be borne by that enterprise."
Klemme, The Enterprise Theory of Torts, 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 153, 158 (1976). In
Louisiana, enterprise liability has been defined as imposing liability on "the person or
entity that caused risk to the public through some enterprise . . . [so that they are]
responsible for the damage caused by the enterprise." Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.
2d 1285, 1292 n.3 (La. 1978). Enterprise liability is already imposed for ultra-hazardous
activities and workmens' compensation among others. For ultra-hazardous activities, see
Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d at 498; Sampay v. Morton Salt Co., 482 So.
2d 752, 757 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
73. "The courts of this state have floundered from one theory to another to no
theory at all in determining the right to recover for damages caused to neighboring
property by a hazardous or unusual activity or by the use of a dangerous instrumentality
or material ... Sometimes article 667 was cited in conjunction with the theory and
sometimes not." Reymond v. State Dept. of Hwys., 255 La. 425, 439, 231 So. 2d 375,
389 (1970). This ambiguity resulted in some appellate courts refusing to determine the
basis of an action grounded upon article 667. In Androwski v. Ole McDonald's Farms,
Inc., 407 So. 2d 455, 459 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 409 So. 2d 666 (1982), the
first circuit declined to determine whether an action for the overflow of a sewerage
oxidation pond was based on article 667 as a legal servitude or was based on article 667
as a type of fault in article 2315. Likewise, the third circuit declined to determine the
character of an action for damages resulting from crop-dusting. Russel v. Windsor Prop-
erties, Inc., 366 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978). "Further we conclude that we need
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the past, the courts' development of theories interpreting article 667 has
been result oriented. This approach led to the development of several
theories of interpretation. 74 The courts have interpreted article 667 as:
a law of property and a servitude, 75 a law of delictual obligations
representing an abuse of right, 76 a type of fault for delictual actions
under article 2315, 77 a type of fault under article 2315 restricted to
ultrahazardous activities, 78 a quasi-contract imposing a duty of vicinage, 9
a law of common law nuisance, 0 and an expression of sic utere.8 1
The range of the various interpretations is due partially to the unique
history of article 667 and accompanying articles 668 and 669. Articles
667 through 6692 were derived from a series of articles by the French
not determine whether defendants' responsibility to plaintiffs results from the application
of LSA-C.C. 667 ... or whether defendants' liability to plaintiff is founded upon the
strict liability of a proprietor under LSA-C.C. Art. 2315 for damages resulting from his
conduct of ultrahazardous activities and/or enterprises on his property." Id. at 223.
74. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 207. See also Reymond,
255 La. at 439, 231 So. 2d at 380: "This fluctuation (the change in theories) has often
been noted ... with criticism of one theory or another, but the results reached in the
cases allowing recovery under these theories have been generally approved."
75. Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971).
76. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 82 So. 206 (1919).
77. D'Albora v. Tulane Univ., 274 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
78. Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp. 508 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1975).
79. Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 518, 211 So. 2d 627, 633 (1968)
(Barham and McCalab, J.J., concurring); Loesch v. R.P. Farnsworth & Co., 12 So. 222
(La. App. Orl. 1943). Vicinage has been defined as "oblig[ing] the neighbor to use their
estates in such a manner as to cause no damage to their neighbors. This rule must be
understood in the sense that, although one is at liberty to do with his estate whatever
he pleases, still one can do nothing which may cause injury to the neighbor." Yiannopoulos,
Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 202 (citing R. Pothier, Traite du Contrat de Societe
No. 235, 4 Oeuvres de Pothier 330 (Bugnet ed. 1861)).
80. Devoke v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947).
81. Chancy v. Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. at 15, 249 So. 2d at 185.
82. The text of articles 667 through 669 is as follows:
Article 667. Limitations on use of property
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he
can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty
of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him.
Article 668. Inconvenience to neighbor
Although one be not at liberty to make any work by which his neighbor's
buildings may be damaged, yet every one has the liberty of doing on his own
ground whatsoever he pleases, although it should occasion some inconvenience
to his neighbor.
Thus he who is not subject to any servitude originating from a particular
agreement in that respect, may raise his house as high as he pleases, although
by such elevation he should darken the lights of his neighbor's house, because
this act occasions only an inconvenience, but not a real damage-
Article 669. Regulation of inconvenience
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commentator Domat, that were not present in the Code Napoleon.3
These articles form a cohesive unit that provides the rights and limitations
of a landowner in the use of his immovable property. 84 However, because
articles 667 through 669 were not present in the French Civil Code,
there was little organized doctrine to provide Louisiana courts in inter-
preting them.85
Alternate Theories of Interpretation
As noted earlier, the Butler court interpreted the duty of article 667
as a specific expression of a delictual obligation under article 2315.
Another delictual theory of interpretation is the common law doctrine
of nuisance. Nuisance theory, which is analogous to liability under article
669,86 applies a reasonableness test to determine whether particular con-
duct should incur liability . 7 An activity is held to be a nuisance. after
balancing the utility of the conduct and the nature of the competing
land uses of the surrounding area."s Originally, the common law theory
If the works or materials for the manufactory or other operation, cause an
inconvenience to those in the same or in the neighboring houses, by diffusing
smoke or nauseous smell, and there be no servitude established by which they
are regulated, their sufferance must be determined by the rules of the police,
or the customs of the place.
83. See A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 32, in 4 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1983); F. Stone, Tort Doctrine § 222, in 12 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1977).
84. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 204-05. Generally, article
667 provides that a landowner may do anything he wants on his land, but that he may
not conduct any activity that causes "damage" to another's property. Article 668 further
explains article 667 by distinguishing "damage" from mere "inconvenience," which must
be tolerated by the neighboring landowners. Article 669, the last- article in the series,
provides that even if the activity only causes an inconvenience, the landowner may not
conduct the activity if it is inconsistent with the surrounding land use or local law. Id.
See also Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69, 72 (La. 1976).
85. Stone, supra note 14, at 708.
86. Id. at 1075; Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 216-20. For*
text of article 669 see supra note 82.
87. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 67, § 88, at 626.
88. "In determining whether an activity or work occasions real damage or mere
inconvenience, a court is required to determine the reasonableness of the conduct in light
of the circumstances. This analysis requires consideration of factors such as the character
of the neighborhood, the degree of the intrusion and the effect of the activity on the
health and safety of the neighbors." Rodrigue, 475 So. 2d at 1077 (emphasis added).
"The activities of a man for which he may be liable without acting negligently are to
be determined after a study of the law and customs, a balancing of claims and interests,
a weighing of the risk and gravity of harm, and a consideration of individual and societal
rights and obligations." Langlois, 258 La. at 1084, 249 So. 2d at 140. This is the same
analysis as common law. See F. Harper, F. James & 0. Gary, supra note 50 at 90; W.
Prosser & W. Keeton, supra note 67, § 88, at 626-27.
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of nuisance was used in lieu of article 667.9 Later, nuisance theory was
incorporated into some Louisiana courts' interpretations of article 667,90
even though it has been recognized that nuisance should be distinguished
from article 667.91
It is unnecessary to interpret article 667 as representing the doctrine
of nuisance. Nuisance actions can be maintained under article 669. Also,
the theory of nuisance does not impose an absolute duty. Nuisance
theory balances competing land uses based on consideration of the
character of the neighborhood, the circumstances surrounding the activity
or structure, and the reasonableness of the conduct. 92 This is inconsistent
with article 667, 91 which only requires that the plaintiff prove damages
and cause in fact. Nuisance theories should be employed only in actions
brought under article 669, not article 667. 94
Another major line of cases interpret article 667 outside of tort law.
One such interpretation describes article 667 as an expression of sic
utere,95 which creates an independent action for damages separate from
article 2315.96 Under the sic utere interpretation, article 667 creates a
89. See, e.g., McGee v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944),
action for damages resulting from smoke and soot from railways. See also Butler, 529
So. 2d at 377 ("[plrior to the translation of the French commentators by the Louisiana
Law Institute and the subsequent commitment to the interpretation of the Civil Code
without reference to common law doctrine, article 667 was interpreted in terms of common
law nuisance .... ").
90. See, e.g., Borgnemouth Realty Co v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 So. 2d
488 (1947); Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry. Co., 211 La. 729, 30 So. 2d 816 (1947); McGee
v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d 21 (1944). For later cases, see, e.g.,
Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So. 2d 1071, 1077-78 (La. 1985) (citing Robichaux v. Hup-
penbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385 (1971); McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services
of La., Inc., 456 So. 2d 612 (La. 1984)); Bornstein v. Joseph Fein Caterers, 255 So. 2d
800 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
91. The Fifth Circuit upheld jury instructions regarding the application of article 667
based on common law nuisance. The court recognized that a nuisance-type balancing test
should be confined to actions under article 669, but allowed the instructions anyway
concluding "Louisiana cases, however, and the case before us, mix these elements [of
absolute liability and nuisance]. It is therefore correct to say that the jury instructions
were confusing only insofar as Louisiana law itself is unclear on this point." Schexnayder
v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 1975).
92. For discussion, see supra note 88.
93. Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. See infra note 128.
95. There is broad agreement under all of the different interpretations that article
667 encompasses the general principles of the doctrine of sic utere, but the independent
basis of an action for damages remains disputed. See also supra notes 52-53.
96. This was first expressed .in Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co, 227 La. 866,
80 So. 2d 845 (1955) (defendant held liable for damage as a result of seismic blasting).
The principle of sic utere was enunciated without citing article 667, in Tucker v. Vicksburg,
S. & P. Ry. Co., 125 La. 689, 697, 51 So. 689, 691 (1910): "The principle of the common
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legal servitude that limits the rights of ownership. 97 A violation of the
servitude imposed by article 667 that causes damages is considered a
violation of a legal obligation, giving the injured party direct remedies
for injunction and damages. 9s Some interpretations even recognize there
may be parallel actions in tort and property for the same breach. 99
Another nontort interpretation imposes a quasi-contractual duty on
landowners not to use their land in such a way as to cause damage to
their neighbors. Under this view, article 667 imposes a personal obligation
that creates a quasi-contract between neighboring proprietors.1)t Relying
on articles 667 and 2292, courts have held that the "proprietor" has
an action based on quasi-contract, which prescribes in ten years.' 0'
Neither the sic utere or the quasi-contract interpretation is consistent
with the nature of an action brought under article 667. Articles 667
through 669 create rights and duties that are best interpreted under tort
law. Article 667, and articles 668 and 669, create duties against causing
harm and have been interpreted as imposing liability for damages. This
is very similar to delictual actions under article 2315. Further, the
prescriptive period'0 2 and burden of proof' 03 for delicts have already
been applied to actions brought under article 667. In addition, a delictual
interpretation would be consistent with the Langlois framework, which
interprets all tort actions through article 2315.
Article 667 has been also construed as imposing absolute liability
only for ultrahazardous activities. These decisions, however, used article
and of the civil law, as well as the rules of morality, teaches that one should not use
his own to the detriment of his neighbor." Article 667 was also interpreted as an expression
of sic utere in Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So. 2d 495, 496-97 (La. App. Orl. 1951), although
the court then applied article 667 with article 2315.
Later cases supporting this interpretation include Lombard v. Water and Sewer Bd.,
284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973) (liability for digging underground canal); Chaney v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 259 La. 1, 249 So. 2d 181 (1971) (liability for dredging canal); and
Gotreaux v. Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So. 2d 293 (1957) (liability for crop-dusting). Ironically,
these later cases developed concurrently with the Langlois interpretation, which interpreted
article 667 and article 2315 together.
97. A. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes § 33, in 4 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1983).
98. See supra note 14.
99. See Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 99 (Barham, J., concurring); Yiannopoulos,
Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 223. See also Yiannopoulos, supra note 32, at 186.
The required elements for a cause of action for damages under article 667 may be the
same whether in tort or in property. See supra note 63.
100. Loesch v. R. P. Farnsworth, 12 So. 2d 222 (La. App. Orl. 1943). The Orleans
Court of Appeals held that an action for damage from non-negligent pile-driving arose
ex contractu and was a violation of a quasi-contract. See also Craig v. Montelepre Realty
Co., 252 La. 502, 518, 211 So. 2d 627, 633 (1968) (Barham and McCaleb, J.J., concurring).
101. Craig, 211 So. 2d at 633.
102. Dean v. Hercules, Inc., 328 So. 2d 69, 72 (La. 1976).
103. Russel v. Windsor Properties, Inc., 366 So. 2d 219, 223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
667 to circumvent earlier decisions that had excluded strict and absolute
liability from article 2315.104 Since Langlois expanded the definition of
fault in article 2315 to include absolute liability, liability for ultraha-
zardous activities can be based on article 2315, and there is no reason
to limit article 667 to ultrahazardous activities.
In place of article 667, the courts can use article 2315 alone to
establish liability for ultrahazardous activities, using prior decisions based
on article 667 as guidelines in establishing whether an activity is ultra-
hazardous or not. The Louisiana Supreme Court has already followed
this trend in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,' °1 which addressed the
criteria for absolute liability for ultrahazardous activities without men-
tioning article 667.106 Because article 667 is no longer necessary to
establish a duty for ultrahazardous activities, the courts can now apply
article 667 free of the restrictions of ultrahazardous liability.
Two possible interpretations of article 667 remain. The first of these
is the interpretation of the Butler court, which would impose absolute
liability for all activities that relate to land. The second is the doctrine
of abuse of right, which would impose liability only for those activities
that have no "serious or legitimate purpose." 0 7 The first of these has
already been criticized; there has been no analysis of the effects of
imposing absolute liability on landowners, possessors, tenants, and their
agents for any and all activities on their land that happen to cause
damage to neighboring landowners. Neither does the Butler court provide
any justification for such a rule.
The abuse of right theory, by contrast, could be used to provide
a consistent theoretical framework for acting under article 667 in the
future. The abuse of right theory could be used to provide a more
limited interpretation of article 667, which would not expand liability
and would be consistent with existing jurisprudence and doctrine. An
abuse of right is the exercise of a legal right that exceeds the social
and economic purposes for which the law recognizes that right. 08 If the
defendant cannot show any "serious and legitimate purpose" in exer-
104. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 215.
105. Kent v. Gulf States Util. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982). The case,
nevertheless, is not inconsistent with interpreting article 667 as a basis of ultrahazardous
liability since the court did not discuss the basis of liability and only provided a factual
test for determining whether an activity was ultrahazardous or not. Kent, 418 So. 2d at
498. Further, the cases on which the court based their opinion were all related to article
667. See, e.g., Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1262 (5th Cir. 1985).
106. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 498.
107. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 219-20. See also Cueto-Rua,
Abuse of Rights, 35 La. L. Rev. 965, 992-93 (1975).
108. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 198.
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cising his right,'- or the exercise of the right exceeds its purpose," 0 and
the exercise of this property right causes harm to another, then the
defendant is liable for damages."'
Abuse of right has been used to interpret article 667 as early as
1919.112 Moreover, the doctrine is consistent with the language and history
of the article." 3 Abuse of right also has been well recognized by the
courts and commentators in Louisiana." 4 Further, this doctrine is a
civilian concept that is used in almost all civil law systems, and the
experience of other civilian jurisdictions could provide guidance in future
applications of article 667." 5 Although abuse of right is also recognized
as establishing a duty under article 2315,116 this should not prevent the
109. Lambert v. Maryland Casualty Co., 403 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 418 So. 2d 553 (1982).
110. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 219.
111. Id. The court in Butler addresses this theory, but does not use it to interpret
article 667. In the court's discussion of Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821 (La.
1974), the court, noting that Justices Barham and Tate concurred, held that "667 is
designed to protect property from the abuse of right of ownership." Butler, 529 So. 2d
at 379. Also in Hero Lands Co., 310 So. 2d at 98, which is discussed in Butler, the
court ultimately held that an action originally based on article 667, was supportable as
"an action for abuse of rights under article 2315 of the Civil Code."
112. Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 145 La. at 246, 82 So. at 211.
113. The articles represent a duty fundamental to civilian law: "[Allthough one is at
liberty to do with his estate whatever he pleases, still one can do nothing which may
cause injury to the neighbor." Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 202
(citing Ulpinian, D. 1.1.10) and 219. This interpretation has been supported in several
Louisiana Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co., 145 La. at 246, 82
So. at 211; Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974) (Barham and Tate,
J.J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1064, 1075 (5th Cir. 1975)
("Articles 667 and 668 establish reciprocel rights and duties of neighboring landowners
in accordance with the civilian concept of abuse of right."); Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290
So. 2d 821, 825 (La. 1974) (Barham and Tate, J.J., concurring); Higgins Oil & Fuel Co.,
145 La. at 246, 82 So. at 211; Androwski v.'Ole McDonald's Farms, Inc., 407 So. 2d
455, 459 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 409 So. 2d 666 (1982); Stone, supra note 14,
at 710; Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 218, 219.
115. Cueto-Rua, supra note 107, at 971.
116. Although applied under article 667, some courts now base actions for abuse of
right on article 2315. See, e.g., Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 344 So. 2d
1353 (La. 1977); Breland v. Louisiana Hosp. Services, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1215 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984). Some courts even include actions that involve typical article 667 situations.
Hero Lands Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So. 2d 93, 98 (La. 1975). See also Salter v. B.W.S.
Corp., 290 So. 2d 821, 827 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., concurring); McCastle v. Rollins
Environmental Services, 456 So. 2d 612, 618 (La. 1984):
The essence of the causes of action, which arisen under Civil Code article 667,
668, 669 and perhaps 2315 as an abuse of right ... is that the defendants
conducted activities on their premeises which unreasonably inconvenienced and
personally injured the members of the class for which the defendants are strictly
liable.
NOTES
courts from imposing a special abuse of right duty on "proprietors"
under article 667.
Under the abuse of right interpretation, article 667 limits a lan-
downer's rights by proscribing the exercise of a right that has no "serious
or legitimate purpose" or "where it exceeds the social and economic
purposes for which the law recognizes the right of ownership. 111 7 A
breach of this duty would constitute "fault" and actions for damages
would be based on article 2315.118 Under this interpretation, liability
under article 667 would be only based on abuse of rights and would
be independent of ultrahazardous liability. Liability for ultrahazardous
activities would be based on article 2315 alone. 1 9
Under the abuse of rights interpretation, the Butler court's definition
of "proprietor" could still be used.2 0 It is necessary, however, to define
to whom proprietors owe this duty. The term "neighbor" in article 667
should be interpreted to include any possessor of land who is adjacent
to the defendant's land or whose damages are within the scope of the
risk of the defendant's conduct. 2 1 A "proprietor" would only be found
liable if his act in fact caused harm to a neighbor and the proprietor
had no serious or legitimate purpose or exceeded the social or economic
purpose in exercising the particular right of ownership. 2 There would
be no restriction of article 667 to any particular activity, as long as it
was conducted by a "proprietor" on his immovable property. If an
abuse of right caused damage, the plaintiff would have a remedy for
damages based on Civil Code article 2315.
The abuse of right theory could also be applied consistently with
the broad holding of Butler. According to some commentators, the
abuse of right doctrine can be extended to include the duty to "not
injure seriously any right of his neighbor.' '2 3 This would comport with
117. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 199-200. See also Cueto-
Rua, supra note 107, at 1001-02 and 992-93.
118. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1076-77, 249 So. 2d 133, 139
(1971).
119. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
121. See Stone, supra note 14, at 711.
To be a "neighbor" one need not be an adjoining landowner; as article 651
(no longer in the code) says "it suffices that [the lands] be sufficiently near,
for one to derive benefit from the servitude on the other." It seems clear that
the plaintiff must be one whose interest has been invaded by the defendant's
conduct, but the nature of the interest required is not so clear. . . . [I]t seems
clear that the plaintiff must have a property interest, but again we may ask:
is it necessary that "proprietor" mean "owner"?
122. See, e.g., Breland v. Louisiana Hosp. Services, Inc., 468 So. 2d 1215, 1233 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1985).
123. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 219.
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article 668, which distinguishes between acts that cause real damage and
acts that only cause inconveniences,2 4 and would also be consistent with
the holding in Butler. Any act of the proprietor that caused serious
injury to his neighbor would be considered an abuse of right, and the
neighbor could collect damages by showing cause-in-fact and injury.
Article 668
In addition to interpreting article 667, the accompanying articles,
668 and 669 must be defined, because the articles as a whole provide
the limits and rights of a proprietor's activities on their immovable
property. Article 668 distinguishes between a proprietor's acts that cause
damage and those acts that only cause inconvenience. In conjunction
with the abuse of rights theory of article 667, article 668 should be
interpreted as differentiating legitimate exercises of rights that cause only
inconvenience and abuse of rights that cause real damage. Because of
the absolute duty imposed by article 667, article 668 is necessary to
provide the courts with some discretion to allow "proprietors" to exercise
rights of ownership even if the actions have no purpose and cause
inconvenience. 2
Article 669
The final article in the series, article 669, limits the rights and
obligations of the "proprietor" even further by prohibiting activities
that are not abuse of rights, or only cause inconvenience, but nevertheless
are inconsistent with prevailing land use. 26 The duty of article 669
should be interpreted similar to nuisance theory, which is consistent with
the jurisprudence in Louisiana. 27 Acts that would not be considered an
abuse of right under article 667 could be considered a nuisance if the
actions were inconsistent with surrounding land use or zoning regulations.
As with article 667, a breach of article 669 would constitute "fault"
under article 2315, and could entitle the plaintiff to damages. 2
To avoid confusion between articles 667 and 669,129 the duties of
article 669 should clearly be distinguished from the duties of article
124. See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 245, 82
So. 206, 211 (1919).
125. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 477 "[o]wnership is the right that confers on
a person direct, immediate, and exclusive authority over a thing. The owner of a thing
may use, enjoy, and dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established
by law."
126. Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 220.
127. See, e.g., Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1069, 1076 (5th Cir. 1975);
Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1083, 249 So. 2d 133, 138 (1971).
128. See Langlois, 258 La. at 1083, 249 So. 2d at 137.
129. See, e.g., Schexnayder, 508 F.2d at 1076.
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667.130 This confusion between the different nature of actions under
articles 667 and 669 is probably responsible for much of the ambiguity
regarding the interpretation of article 667.131
Application of the Suggested Framework
Under the suggested traditional abuse of rights framework, using
the facts in Butler, liability could have been established under three
different theories. First, using the abuse of rights duty imposed by article
667, Butler could have claimed damages under article 2315. Butler could
have proved Baber abused his rights to dredge the canal by either proving
that Baber had no serious or legitimate interest in dredging the canal
by the particular method used or by proving that Baber exceeded the
social and economic purposes of his mineral lease and canal right-of-
way by dredging in a manner that produced excessive amounts of silt.
Second, Butler could have also alleged liability under article 2315
for ultrahazardous activities and attempted to prove to the court that
dredging should be classified as an ultrahazardous activity pursuant to
the factors enunciated in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co. 132 and Perkins
v. F.LE. Corp. 33 Finally, under article 669 Butler could have attempted
to prove that the particular type and manner of dredging the canal was
inconsistent with prevailing land use, constituting fault under article
2315.
Conclusion
Although there are many possible frameworks for interpreting articles
667, 668, and 669, the suggested framework was designed to follow the
language of the Civil Code articles as closely as possible and provide
130. The distinction between articles 667 and 669 has been well recognized. See Yian-
nopoulos, Civil Responsibility, supra note 14, at 207, and Yiannopoulos, Obligations of
Vicinage, supra note 14, at 477. See also Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1255
(5th Cir. 1985); Schexnayder v. Bunge Corp., 508 F.2d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1975); Salter
v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974) (Tate and Barham, J.J., concurring);
Robichaux v. Huppenbauer, 258 La. 139, 245 So. 2d 385, 392 (1971) (Barham, J.,
concurring); Reymond v. State Dept. of Hwys., 255 La. 425, 443, 231 So. 2d 375, 382
n.6 (1970); Stewart v. City of Pineville, 511 So. 2d 26, 28-29 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
Article 669 provides a balancing or reasonableness test corresponding to common law
nuisance, Yiannopoulos, Obligations of Vicinage, supra note 14, at 477, while under article
667 all that is necessary is to prove damages and cause in fact. Lombard, 284 So. 2d
at 914.
131. A good example of this confusion is present in Rodrigue v. Copeland, 475 So.
2d 1071 (La. 1985). In Rodrigue, the supreme court applied a nuisance balancing test,
citing article 667 in conjunction with articles 668 and 669. Id. at 1078-79.
132. 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982).
133. 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985). For discussion, see supra notes 105-106 and
accompanying text.
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a rule of law that furthers societal goals of risk-spreading and risk
deterrence without deterring conduct that is beneficial to society. As
enunciated, the abuse of right interpretation could be used to limit
absolute liability in Louisiana to only ultrahazardous activities. Abuse
of right is also consistent with expanding the application of article 667
to all land-related activities and could be used as the theoretical basis
of Butler. What is important is that the paradigm is clear and flexible
enough to be applied consistently to different fact situations, creating
realistic and rational expectations of the liability associated with partic-
ular behaviors. A clear framework would also provide a solid foundation
for subsequent legislative or jurisprudential modification rationally based
on changing societal objectives.
John C. Anjier
